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Breivik’s Manifesto 2083 A European Declaration of Independence 
 
This article will examine the writings of one of the key voices who influenced Anders 
Breivik: Peder Jensen. Writing under the pen name Fjordman, Jensen has developed a 
range of writings, some of which have come to operate at the interface between 
Islamophobic populism and contemporary fascist terrorism. To explore this interface, 
this article will analyse the various writings by Jensen / Fjordman that Breivik himself 
reproduced in his manifesto 2083 A European Declaration of Independence. It will conclude 
that, while not directly instructing Breivik to carry out an act of terrorism, there is 
nevertheless a looser connection between Jensen’s rhetoric, which points towards violent 
action, and the behavior of others such as Breivik. It explores this link through the lens 
of ‘license’, a methodology developed by Aristotle Kallis. This approach allows the 
analysis to highlight that, beneath a veneer of more moderate anti-Muslim populism, the 
discourse Peder Jensen has written under the pen name Fjordman evokes many of the 
tropes of fascism, including: coded endorsement of ethnic nationalism, misogyny, 
conspiracy theories, a concern with profound cultural decadence, and a palingenetic 
discourse that idealizes revolution coming about through war.    
 
 
The study of terrorism often gravitates around analyzing perpetrator figures, alongside 
those who actively guide them, and so these direct actors are rightly placed at the center 
of much academic investigation. Yet when it comes to issues such as motivation, the role 
of factors seen to have a more indirect impact on a terrorist operation are also important 
to discuss. In particular, the study of the voices that generate the underpinning 
ideological cultures, the worldviews, than help to incubate the rationale for terrorist 
campaigns, are of great importance too.1 The relationship between terrorists and their 
views is often under-explored, despite ideology’s crucial importance to the formation of 
perceived or actual communities of support that underpin the milieus that motivate 
terrorist perpetrators.2 What follows in this article is developed from the premise that 
terrorist violence needs to be made desirable before it can be carried out. Thus, whatever 
solo-actor or group-actor terrorists may do with a more prevalent ideological position 
being disseminated more widely, in order to reconfigure it into a set of arguments that 
explicitly justifies violence, it is crucial to understand the role of cultural frameworks that 
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give implicit license – a license to hate – that also contributes to violent actions. The 
discourses that make terrorist violence appear necessary, then, are crucial to map, yet this 
is also a field riddled with problematic issues.  
With this theme of licensing forms of hatred in mind, this article will focus on 
the ideological writings created by just one of the Islamophobic ideologues found 
regularly cited within the pages of Anders Breivik’s manifesto, 2083 A European 
Declaration of Independence: Peder Jensen, a.k.a. Fjordman.3 Indeed, crystallizing Breivik’s 
dedication to the ideas of Fjordman, the final essay by Fjordman reproduced in 2083 A 
European Declaration of Independence is itself titled ‘A European Declaration of 
Independence’, which sets out the need for revolutionary action. 4  For Breivik, the 
writings by Jensen, were crucial to giving his own terror campaign meaning. Indeed, 
Breivik singled him out for regular particular praise in his tome, and in total 112,735 
words of the manifesto’s entire word count of 772,643 words comprise of articles by 
Jensen, using the Fjordman pen name. It is specifically these texts that will be analyzed 
by this article. Thus, this paper seeks to explore in detail the elements of Jensen’s 
discourse that Breivik found most relevant to rationalizing his actions. It will conclude 
that these articles conform to a typically fascist discourse that gravitates around tropes of 
heterophobia, extreme national purification and political revolution emerging from a 
period of warfare and crisis. Though they do not necessary directly promote terrorist 
violence of the type that Breivik subsequently carried out, the discourse certainly evokes 
a paranoid worldview, one that suggests an armed citizenry should overthrow corrupt 
national and international systems of governance. Other common features of what can 
be characterized as a fascist discourse also include conspiracies linked to ‘hidden’ 
historical forces, while also singling out scapegoat community that becomes the focus of 
emotive heterophobia. Examination of such themes will be crucial to understanding the 
cultural paradigms from which occasional acts of fascist terrorism, such as Breivik’s, 
emerge.  
Moreover, more nuanced reflections on the issue of the ‘cultures of support’ that 
underpin terrorist violence of the type enacted by Breivik chimes with a ‘cultural turn’ 
underway within terrorism studies. This is marked by figures such as Roger Griffin and 
Mark Juergensmeyer, 5  whose analysis is far less motivated by addressing questions 
regarding managing security risks, of the type more regularly posed by policy makers, and 
instead is more concerned with identifying the deep-seated cultural and ideological divers 
of action taken against those deemed ‘other’ by an extremist perspective. Before moving 
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on to an analysis of Jensen’s writings that were reproduced 2083 A European Declaration of 
Independence – a central set of writings that clearly interface between the views of an 
ideologue who came to hold the role as a voice within a ‘community of support’ 
constructed by a terrorist – it is important to revisit a selection of the recent literature on 
the topic of fascist ideologies licensing political violence. In particular, the issue of 
constructions of heterophobia, and the myth of national purity, found within fascist 
discourses are crucial to identify. Therefore, this opening discussion will establish more 
fully the common tropes within the types of discourses likely to be cited by a violent 
actor as, in part, justifying fascist terrorism.  
 
Anti-Islamic Heterophobia and the Fascist Mythology of Cleansing the Nation 
Central to the milieus generated at the extreme fringes of all far right cultures is the 
notion that radical action is needed to purge and purify a national, or similarly 
‘imagined’, 6  discrete community. The elimination of the ‘other’, combined with the 
resurrection of the national community, lies at the core of the fascist project, and is 
steeped in mythic tropes. Highlighting this point, one leading model for analyzing the 
political dynamics of interwar fascism, developed by Michael Mann, stresses that fascism 
is defined by a particular form of Nation-Statism engaged with projects of ‘cleansing’.7 
Therefore, fascism is essentially a type of politics based on a binary juxtaposing radically 
‘imagined’ and ‘pure’ national communities that are seen as suffering at the hands of a 
seemingly alien force, specifically to the point that the imagined community is facing an 
extreme existential threat. Consequently, fascists see this external, existential threat as 
needing eradication before the safety of the national community can be secured. Thus, 
fascist politics is the act of formulating action that will cleanse the nation state. Via 
writings, party campaigning, or indeed violence, this is a feature that lies at the core of all 
fascist ideologies, and historically such groups have found broader social support by 
engaging with commonly held prejudices. For Mann, para-militarism is also a core 
definitely feature of fascism, though this is a more contentious point. What do we do 
when it comes to people who promote such ideas, but are, for example, merely sitting at 
computers when doing so? Arguably one does not have to be engaged in paramilitary 
activity to be classified as a fascist.8 
This theme of ‘cleansing’ also raises further questions regarding how the fascist 
‘other’ is constructed. While some of the most evocative, historical forms of such fascist 
scapegoating revolve around a clearly racially-defined ‘other’, such as Nazism’s biological 
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construction of Jewishness,9 more contemporary fascists’ concern with ‘purification’ can 
no longer be seen through the lens of such straightforward, biological racism. In some 
ways at least, fascism’s contemporary discourses have become more nuanced, and now 
even claim to reject the crass biological racism typical of Nazism. Nevertheless, we 
should remember the notion of ‘race’ at the core of such forms of interwar, fascist 
racism was always a slippery concept, at once scientific (or at least pseudo-biological), 
while also developed via a variety of mythic tropes surrounding ideas promoting cultural 
homogeneity. Thus, interwar racial nationalists offered their adherents socially 
constructed identities such as ‘the Aryan race’ that claimed to present clear cultural 
characteristics, especially when juxtaposed with a racially defined colonial, or especially 
Jewish, ‘other’, but were ultimately imagined cultural creations.  
As the postwar era has progressed, especially via the influence of the New Right 
thinking of figures such as Alain de Benoist and his attempted to invert of ‘racism’ 
through the discourse of differentialism (which even styles those promoting 
multiculturalism as the true racists), the notion of ‘fascist racism’ has become ever more 
nebulous and problematic to define. 10  The turn to a distinct anti-Muslim, or 
Islamophobic, rhetoric in recent times, one directed far more at the cultural forms found 
within Islamic communities, has added a further layer of complexity. Nevertheless, as we 
will see in the case of Jensen’s writings, the modern, fascist evocations of a primarily 
culturally, rather than a racially, defined ‘other’ will often use such rhetorical mechanisms 
to legitimize what are ultimately rather convectional, entho-nationalist prejudices, once 
again juxtaposing a white community with a non-white ‘other’. The remainder of this 
article will use the more embracing term of ‘heterophobia’, literally a fear of the ‘other’, 
to help side-step some of the terminological problems with ‘race’. Heterophobia offers 
more straightforward, generic concept for categorising the variety of prejudices (both 
racial and cultural) presented by the historical and contemporary fascists, and wider far 
right milieus, to evoke an anxiety inducing ‘other’, and a ‘war of identities’. 
Indeed, this concern with a quest for racial and cultural purity, and the inevitable 
promotion of heterophobia that gravitates fears around an anxiety-inducing ‘other’, seen 
as posing an existential threat, is a recurrent feature of contemporary fascist, and wider 
far right, politics too. For such protagonists, political action revolves around opposition 
to this ‘other’. So whereas interwar extremists, such as the Nazis, focused their ire on 
racist constructions of Jews as the binary opposite of the idealized Aryan, the 
contemporary far right milieus achieve a broadly similar politics by juxtaposing themes of 
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national purity and heterophobia. However, these contemporary far right milieus they 
operate within, often now do so by evoking narratives that contrast a selectively ‘liberal’ 
Europe with an archaic, anachronistic-seeming invasion from crusading Islam. 11 
Employing a variety of stereotypes and clichés, which will be explored further below via 
the emblematic example of Jensen’s writings, this new ‘other’ is presented by 
contributors to this discourse as having an unsettling, uncanny presence in modern, 
secularized – though still distinctly culturally Christian, or sometimes Judeo-Christian – 
Europe. In such texts, it is assumed to be a point of common agreement between the 
author and the reader that Muslims are out of place, and at least implicitly suggest the 
ideal of such communities being removed.  
This is an assumption has found a wide variety of outlets. Indeed, given the 
prevalence of such anti-Muslim messages, we can see that the overall ‘culture of support’ 
for the extremists such as Breivik is both multiple and diverse.12 This feature also helps 
explain why we can see a diverse range of figures being cited by Breivik in 2083 A 
European Declaration of Independence’ – which even includes figures such as current British 
Member of Parliament Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove. While such anti-
Muslim milieus can be located in populist media coverage,13 and the political mainstream 
too, this discourse finds more radical articulation in the words of neo-populist politicians, 
who regularly engage in a more radical politics grounded in breaking taboos to gain 
media attention.14 Examples of more populist political voices here include figures such as 
Geert Wilders, a now high-profile Dutch personality who promotes anti-Muslim 
messages via films such as Fitna.15 Nevertheless, these far right politicians are not fascists. 
Wilders, for example, clearly lacks the revolutionary drive found within either the 
interwar fascist movements, or the more extreme fringes of the postwar neo-Nazi 
movement. It is only outside such political party structures, which are constrained by 
attempts to achieve a level of public credibility, that one can locate more clearly fascist 
strains of the anti-Muslim heterophobic discourse.  
How do we characterize these differences? This is a complex question. One 
approach to drawing a distinction between the more socially acceptable messages of far 
right populism, and the more extremist messages of fascism, is a focus on the arguments 
such figures develop to achieve political change. Fascism can be identified when we see 
such discourses employing a revolutionary, or palingenetic, framework for describing the 
processes of political change. Indeed, following the interventions of Roger Griffin 
regarding the definition of fascism, we can note that the myth of palingenesis, or societal 
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rebirth, lies at the core of fascist political projects. 16  Such a mythic, revolutionary 
dynamic frames the present as a liminal era, explicitly rejects extant political structures, 
and calls for their recasting in fundamentally new forms, in order to create a purified, 
utopian era for the nation-state. One online space where such palingenetic views have 
become articulated is the website Gates of Vienna.17 This is an online environment where 
Jensen published his own writings, and is a space that also became crucial to the 
radicalization of Anders Breivik. Indeed, in 2083: A European Declaration of Independence 
Breivik even stresses that one can see its output as offering a new school of 
contemporary nationalist thinking, the ‘Vienna School’ (not to be confused with other 
usages of this term).18 So while in more mainstream contexts, the contemporary far right 
tends to curtail engagement with a revolutionary rhetoric, one finds in such locations a 
far less guarded style of discourse, and even a new register for fascist heterophobia.  
Finally, what are we to make of the connection between fascist texts steeped in 
heterophobia and the promotion of violence? This is a question addressed by another 
contributor to this special issue, Aristotle Kallis. Here and elsewhere, Kallis sees this 
issue in terms of ideologies specifically providing their adherents with a license to 
entertain extremist perspectives that are otherwise seen as taboo by the surrounding 
cultural environment.19 Whether intentionally or otherwise, they help to raise desires that, 
at least implicitly, point towards violent activities, while also operating in a manner that 
removes moral objections towards committing violence in certain circumstances. So the 
appeal of fascist ideologies, usually only to a susceptible relative few, is their ability to 
give ‘license’ firstly to hatred before, in certain extreme and contingent conditions, also 
giving ‘license’ to carry out violence too. In the most extreme circumstances, this may 
include murder or even genocide. (Indeed, Kallis’s own concern with this question 
originated with the historical and political milieus that enabled genocides to break out in 
Europe during the Second World War,20 though his approach has a wider application 
too.)  
While the realm of the mass participatory political violence that characterizes 
genocide is not currently on the agenda in contemporary Europe, there is a trend 
towards more localized pockets of political violence that are being ‘licensed’ by fascist 
heterophobia, epitomized by Breivik himself. Although the discourses found on online 
spaces such as Gates of Vienna are not the only factor for understanding the psychology 
and motivation for terrorist praxis, the authors of such sites are certainly an important 
component of the milieu that incubates political violence. As we will see, the discourses 
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found in such locations are steeped in a heterophobia that offer diagnoses of recent 
events that evoke a profound sense of crisis in the present, while also projecting fantasies 
of the future where the notion of the ‘other’ no longer exists as a threat, and so society 
has been purified. So although they often leave the key question of how precisely to get 
from one state of affairs to the other to the reader’s imagination, their radicalising 
function is relatively clear.  
With these themes of fascist heterophobia, and its quest for national purity, in 
mind, we can now address the core research question of this article: how clearly do Peder 
Jensen’s essays, written under the pen name Fjordman, and which Breivik chose to 
reprint in his manifesto 2083 A European Declaration of Independence, develop core tropes of 
a fascist discourse that promotes heterophobia, a license to hate, and a vision of national 
purity achieved through revolutionary war? 
 
Bat Ye’Or and Eurabia 
In total, 37 articles written by Jensen were included in 2083 A European Declaration of 
Independence, which (including references) make up just over 14.5% of its total word 
count. The initial two of these essays, interspersed throughout the document, engage 
with failings in western education, while also critiquing Islamic scholars, and their 
scientific achievements in particular.21 Moreover, the theme of wealthy Arab Muslims 
funding projects within European universities is discussed in several places, especially in 
these early essays.22 Such arguments tend to gravitate around a core point claiming that 
mainstream education institutions in Europe has been corrupted by such financial 
influences, and are not to be trusted. With these arguments in mind, the historicising of 
Jensen’s radical worldview where the mainstream is not to be trusted was developed in 
the third, and most lengthy, essay of the entire collection, ‘EU’s Eurabia Project (The 
Eurabia Code) – Documenting EU’s deliberate strategy to Islamise Europe’. The allusion 
to ‘The Eurabia Code’ in the title is a nod to Dan Brown’s trashy conspiracy thriller The 
Da Vinci Code, and Jensen sought set out a similar world of hidden forces, although 
according to him this one was not fictional. Notably, in the two previous essays he has 
praised figures such as Bat Ye’or, highlighting such writers as independently minded 
scholars whose work was superior to corrupted university-based academics. Following 
on from this, Ye’or’s volume Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis is discussed at some length, a 
perspective embraced wholeheartedly by both Jensen and later Breivik too. 
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 Central to Ye’or’s Eurabian conspiracy theory is the trope of styling the 
European Union as a corrupt institution working against the interests of European 
people. More specifically, it presents the EU as engaged in a hidden campaign to destroy 
national sovereignty in Europe, and, in particular, allowing the continent to be over-
taken by global Muslim interests. Essentially, the narrative stresses that France has 
historically been at the center of the European Union project, and has acted as a Trojan 
horse for primarily Arab Muslim interests. Indeed, Jensen positively passes on Ye’or’s 
own stress on France’s history of pro-Arab relations. This, he continues, can be 
documented from Napoleon onwards (one of Napoleon’s generals is cited as converting 
to Islam), and so France is presented in Jensen’s assessment of the Eurabia thesis as 
essentially pro-Muslim. The central, recent figure here promoting such an agenda was 
Charles de Gaulle. By pursuing his anti-American foreign policy during the Cold War, 
Jensen stresses that, from 1967, De Gaulle initiated a foreign agenda that placed courting 
the Arab world at its core. This strategy was further accentuated during the 1973 oil 
crisis, and this period also saw the formation of key institutions of the Eurabia 
conspiracy, especially Europe Arab Dialogue.  
Subsequently, other groups augmented the work of this organization, such as the 
European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. Such 
groupings fostered informal links between European and ‘Mediterranean’ (for him, code 
for the Arab world) politicians, which placed the free movement of both goods and 
people at its heart. This ideal, in turn, led to a new wave of Muslim migration entering 
Europe, while Europe’s political elite’s role within the dynamic became one of passive 
acceptance of Islamic dominance. Having been allowed to develop influence in Europe, 
the situation had now reached a crisis point. As Jensen put this: 
 
The new European civilisation in the making can correctly be termed a 
“civilisation of dhimmitude.” The word dhimmitude comes from the Koranic 
word “dhimmi.” It refers to the subjugated, non-Muslim individuals who accept 
restrictive and humiliating subordination to Islamic power in order to avoid 
enslavement or death. The entire Muslim world as we know it today is a product 
of this 1,300 year-old jihad dynamic, whereby once thriving non-Muslim majority 
civilisations have been reduced to a state of dysfunction and dhimmitude. The 
dhimmis are inferior beings who endure humiliation and aggression in silence. 
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This arrangement allows Muslims to enjoy an impunity that increases both their 
hatred and their feeling of superiority, under the protection of the law.23 
 
From such polemical statements, Jensen sets out his typically extreme presentation of the 
existential threat allegedly posed by this all-powerful Islamic force, unleashed by De 
Gaulle, and all subsequent pro-European political leaders, in a bid to promote a pro-
Arab European foreign policy. 
 The idea that France lies at the center of the Eurabian conspiracy is also 
solidified through some further, specious analysis of postwar French society. Strikingly, 
the riots of 2005 are cited as an example of France being held hostage by its new Muslim 
immigrant population. Indeed, France’s Muslim communities are characterized as 
growing exponentially, to the point that the country is on the cusp of civil war. The 
hysteria reaches truly extreme proportions when discussing the issue of France’s nuclear 
weapons in relation to this topic: ‘Above all who will inherit the hundreds of nuclear 
warheads? Will these weapons fall into the hands of Jihadist Muslims too?’24 Finally, the 
commentary develops a document often discussed in such conspiracy circles, ‘The 
Project’, which similar Islamophobic writers, such as Sylvian Besson and Patrick Poole, 
have also written about online too. In many ways, this document acts in a similar manner 
to the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion for anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. ‘The 
Project’ is presented as a hidden ‘blueprint’ of the conspiracy, the tip of the iceberg. 
Here, ‘The Project’ is a plot being put into action by the Muslim Brotherhood, and places 
at its core a plan to take control of the world for the benefit of Muslims. This is taken as 
proof that all Muslims are in some way engaged in such a project. Moreover, according 
to Jensen, its core points are: to develop a long-term cultural invasion of Europe; place 
Muslim voices in key institutions of power in Europe; create new networks and alliances 
to promote the strategy of infiltration; and to use the media an education systems to 
deceive Europeans as to the true purpose of Muslims in contemporary Europe.25  
 Building on such paranoia, a follow-on essay, ‘The Eurabia Code – 2008 Update’, 
advances further the rhetoric of Europe at war. Indeed, here Jensen discusses the theme 
that the European Union represents the formation of an empire, and adds: 
 
It would make sense to remember that all empires in history have been created 
through war. If the EU is an empire, this means that a war is being waged against 
somebody. And it is: A cultural and demographic war waged by mass immigration 
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against native Europeans. Whereas empires are normally created by waging a war 
against other peoples, the EU is the first empire in history created by leaders 
allowing other peoples to wage a war against their own.26 
 
So, what we find neatly expressed in this quote is the typical elision of warfare, battles 
being fought on a cultural front (hence actual fighting is not visible), and an articulation 
of corruption so elemental that political leaders are betraying their people to the point of 
enacting war against them. One implication from such a diagnosis is that mainstream 
politics is not a viable option any more, and that more radical solutions are needed, issues 
we will examine later in the article. 
 
Heterophobia: The Construction of Muslim 
At the core of the Jensen worldview and the Eurabian conspiracy theory, then, is the idea 
of Muslims as invaders of Europe – a broadly similar theme to those developed earlier 
racial fascists, such as Nazis, who saw Jews as incompatible with an authentic Aryan race. 
Of course, the argument stresses that Islam represents a totalitarian political force, and 
wants to impose a profoundly anti-liberal form of Sharia Law. Such distortions are 
replete throughout his articles. Moreover, though Jensen’s essays do not actively steep 
themselves in a language employing openly pejorative terms of racial abuse to demark 
European identity, it is noticeable that the construction of the Muslim ‘other’ is still 
grounded in a language that uses the notion of white identity to evoke the binary 
opposite of a Muslim identity. Indeed, a later essay, ‘What Do We Fight For’ begins with 
a discussion on the attacks faced by white people from Muslim migrants which 
crystallizing this notion: 
 
I have tried to contribute to a new vocabulary by coining the word 
‘Caucasophobia’ for anti-white racism, and have suggested the term ‘self-
termination’ for organised Western self-loathing and the Western policy of 
unilaterally dismantling our own culture. Both terms are OK, but if somebody 
can come up with something better and more catchy, I’m all ears.27  
 
So here as elsewhere a notable language of ‘whiteness’ is employed to construct the 
community that Jensen seeks to identify himself with. The exclusion of, say, non-Muslim 
black people from ‘Caucasophobia’ is implicit, and so such a discourse can hardly make 
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claims to be inclusive of all racial categories when it privileges a Caucasian profiles above 
all others. Elsewhere too, there is slippage into a discourse on whiteness as a racial 
concept, though the focus again is eliding non-white threats with Muslims specifically.  
To take another example, when discussing the emotive topic of rapes by Muslims 
on non-Muslims, he typically phrases his comments as follows: 
 
The massive wave of violence and especially rapes in Western cities now is a 
form of warfare against whites, and it’s about time it is recognised as such.28 
 
Meanwhile, on the issue of non-Muslims becoming engaged in violent action against 
Muslims, we find he is dismissive of the phenomenon. Moreover, again he reverts to a 
language of whiteness and non-whiteness as a way to develop his point. For example, in 
one discussion, surveying some cases of white people in his opinion being treated 
unfairly by authorities after being attacked or abused by Muslims, he, somewhat 
contentiously, stresses: 
 
… as throughout the Western world, white-on-non-white violence is exceedingly 
rare. The vast majority of racism and racist violence comes from non-whites 
against whites, or between different groups of non- whites.29 
 
So we should be aware of this white / non-white binary operating within his discourse 
on European as opposed to Muslim identities. The focus of this heterophobic language 
towards non-whiteness is directly with reference to Muslims as non-whites, as opposed 
to other non-white identities, but his views are nevertheless ultimately underpinned by a 
sense of ‘ethno-differentialist’ racism.  
Turning to the way in which Jensen’s understanding of how to solve the issues 
allegedly posed by Muslims is discussed, he is clear regarding how policies across Europe 
need to be radically revised: 
 
The best way to deal with the Islamic world is to have as little to do with it as 
possible. We should ban Muslim immigration. This could be done in creative and 
indirect ways, such as banning immigration from nations with citizens known to be 
engaged in terrorist activities. We should remove all Muslim non-citizens currently 
in the West. We should also change our laws to ensure that Muslim citizens who 
THIS IS A DRAFT VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE, PLEASE DO NOT CITE 
PLEASE CITE THE PUBLISHED VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN  
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 9/3 (2013) 
advocate sharia, preach Jihad, the inequality of ‘infidels’ and of women should have 
their citizenship revoked and be deported back to their country of origin.30 
 
This again chimes with a long tradition in fascist discourses of imagining the elimination 
of the ‘other’. Such views, when rarely put into action, typically lead to ethnic cleansing 
and even genocide, guided by an imagined ideal of achieving racial or ethnic purity for 
the imagined community. Indeed, when we are considering Jensen’s text through a lens 
of offering a license to hate, recognizing his need to mark Muslims out as one worthy of 
such extreme persecution and removal from society, to the point of mass expulsion from 
the continent, is a crucial component of the discourse to document. Essentially, as with 
earlier fascists, the fantasy is one whereby a mythic sense of national purity can only be 
achieved if Muslims are no longer present.  
In order to more clearly legitimize this viewpoint, Jensen needs to raise emotive 
connotations that style the ‘other’ as uniquely threatening. With the contemporary far 
right discourses that demonize Muslims, the topic of rape has become particularly 
prevalent, and, as we have already seen, is one that is often utilized by Jensen too. This 
subject plays at elemental fears that are raised by the subject of sexual crime, implies a 
level of sexual deviance within the Muslim perpetrators of rapes that is used to generalize 
about the essence of Islam, and finally raises a trope within fascist politics that presents 
the dangerous ‘other’ as particularly underhand as it attacks the most vulnerable, in this 
case innocent women.31 So when developing this notion that Muslims are essentially 
sexual criminals, the opening paragraph of ‘What Does Muslim Immigration Cost 
Europe?’ is again worth citing at length to convey the manner in which this extremist 
rhetoric is deployed:  
  
Do gang rapes boost GDP? Was that an offensive question, you say? Well, 
according to Sweden’s finance minister Pär Nuder, more immigrants should be 
allowed into Sweden in order to safeguard the welfare system. However, in reality 
estimates indicate that immigration costs Sweden at least 40 to 50 billion Swedish 
kroner every year, probably several hundred billions, and has greatly contributed 
to bringing the Swedish welfare state to the brink of bankruptcy.32 
 
The above anti-Muslim language clearly elides the issue of Muslim immigration with a 
rise in violent, sexual crime (he goes on to clarify that he is primarily talking about 
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migrants from ‘Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia’ when he discusses ‘gang rapes’).33 
Jensen also links this threat to failures within the political mainstream, and a crisis for the 
welfare state. Aside from sexual crimes, the specter of terrorism is also contained within 
the dynamic here too, again linked to a critique of the welfare state. For example, this 
particular essay goes on to develop the idea of Muslim migrant communities having a 
high propensity not only to create black markets that hamper the national economy, but 
it also states that Muslims have a propensity to draw disproportionately heavily on 
welfare spending. They then use this as an income stream to fund terrorist activities. 
Thus, in the course of one essay, we are told that Europe’s welfare states are allowing 
Muslims to come to Europe, carry out criminal activities including sexual attacks, and 
even fund a violent political project. 
 It is important to comment on the starkness of Jensen’s characterizing of all 
Muslims as essentially the same. There is no opportunity in his framework for Muslims 
to be understood as anything other than people either engaged in or supporting 
extremism; Jensen leaves no option for any ambiguity or nuance. The essay ‘Why We 
Cannot Rely on Moderate Muslims’ most clearly sets out the rationale for seeing all 
Muslims as a single threat. The underlying trope here is the claim that moderate Muslims 
are being directed by extremist agendas, yet are hiding this from public view. Jensen cites 
an argument made by Robert Spencer claiming that Al-Qaeda recommends that Muslims 
appear as secular in order to blend in with their surroundings.34 So more secularized, 
integrated Muslims are not above suspicion. Elsewhere in the essay, he suggests such 
strategies of fighting a-symmetrical warfare is even encoded within the theology of Islam. 
He cites the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah as an example where Mohammed signed an 
agreement that bought him time to regroup and strengthen his support base. For Jensen, 
this has now become a standard tactic used by Muslims, and, apparently, can be found in 
the Israel-Palestine conflict too, with Palestinians biding their time until they are strong 
enough to launch an attack upon Israel. So though ‘moderate Muslims’ may appear to 
adopt secular attitudes, really they are engaged in the underhand deception of taqiya, 
justification for taking warfare underground and into civilian spaces. Moreover, the idea 
that moderates pursuing peaceful coexistence, while others carry out terrorist attacks, is 
common conspiratorial practice in the Muslim advances being made in Europe. As he 
puts it: 
  
Every act of terrorism, or Jihad as it really is, is seen as an opportunity to push 
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even greater demands. Radical Muslims and moderate Muslims are allies, not 
adversaries. The radicals bomb, and the moderates issue veiled threats that ‘unless 
we get our will, more such attacks will ensue.’ It’s a good cop, bad cop game. 
It is true that Jihad is not exclusively about violence, but it is very much 
about the constant threat of violence. Just like you don’t need to beat a donkey all 
the time to make it go where you want it to, Muslims don’t have to hit non-
Muslims continuously. They bomb or kill every now and then, to make sure that 
the infidels are always properly submissive and know who’s boss.35 
 
Elsewhere too, we find more general articulations of the heterophobic fear of 
cultural difference and plurality. Indeed, Jensen is very clear that European cultures are 
becoming too diverse, and so the correct path to regeneration is for a return to cultural 
purity. In opposition to multicultural agendas, he stresses Europeans need to end 
 
the nonsense of ‘celebrating our differences.’ We should be celebrating our 
sameness and what binds us together. We should clean up our history books and 
school curricula, which have been infected with anti-Western sentiments.36 
 
On this topic, it is also important to highlight the way in which Christianity is also 
evoked in order to help construct the Muslim ‘other’ too. Jensen self-identifies as lacking 
in religious faith, and so is pro-secularization. However, he is keen to draw a distinction 
between Christianity and Judaism, which are ‘European’ religions, and Islam, which is 
not. He presents himself as a defender of the first two, as they both allow for separation 
between church and state. Islam offers no such separation, and so is styled as a threat to 
a secularist such as himself. Moreover, Jensen stresses that, unlike him, multiculturalists 
are actually against Christianity and Judaism. As he puts it: ‘The First Commandment of 
Multiculturalism is: Thou shalt hate Christianity and Judaism’. Indeed, those promoting 
multiculturalism are only interested in promoting Islam, according to Jensen. He also 
views as pro-Muslim propaganda any analysis that presents Islam as a part of European 
history and identity. So while Christianity and Judaism can claim such a European 
heritage, Islam cannot.37  
Finally, despite his support for religion, Jensen is ambivalent regarding the political 
role of churches in the present, especially if they promote ideas that cut against his stark 
anti-Muslim agenda: 
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Christians need to understand that there can be no peace or understanding with 
the Islamic world. They want to subdue us, pure and simple. Church leaders of all 
denominations, Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, must stop stabbing Israel in the 
back and campaigning for a de facto open borders policy while Muslims are 
threatening to swamp our lands. Yes, Christianity teaches compassion, but it also 
teaches identifying evil and standing up to it. At the end of the day, the Church 
must decide whether, in the defence of civilisation, it wants to be a part of the 
problem or a part of the solution.38 
 
In sum, religion offers a vital way of constructing a cultural identity for Jensen, though 
his ideology is not steeped in an actively pro-religious perspective. Moreover, there is 
even an embrace of Judaism, a feature that marks him out from earlier trends in anti-
Semitic fascism. This distancing from Nazism and anti-Semitism is a theme developed 
elsewhere in these writings too. We can also note that when Nazism is regularly and 
openly rejected it is because it is a radical form of left-wing politics. Finally, he even 
suggests that Muslims were responsible for legitimizing the Nazi Holocaust as Muslims 
had previously carried out the Armenian genocide that had inspired Hitler to carry out 
his genocide. 
 
Gender and welfare 
Within Jensen’s discourse of anti-Muslim heterophobia is a trope that, ostensibly, 
defends women, or at least non-Muslim women. In these essays, Islam is framed as a 
religion that oppresses women; thus, destroying the impact of Islam in Europe will 
benefit the continent’s women. So on one level there is a curious embrace of feminist-
style rhetorical strategy here: white Europeans are presented as defenders of modern 
values, including rights for women, while the Muslim ‘other’ is framed as a threat to the 
modern, liberated, ‘European’ woman. Yet beneath this framing of the anti-Muslim 
agenda, one finds a potent, deeply misogynistic tenor within Jensen’s discourse. This is 
very revealing of his defense of western women’s rights in reality being a superficial 
attack on Islam as ‘non-European’, and certainly has nothing to do with feminism per se.  
Indeed, one finds in his discussions on gender, and welfare more generally, that 
Jensen is strikingly orthodox in his fascist rhetoric: he not only views masculinity as 
falling into a state of crisis and decadence, but he also sees a need for restrictions on 
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European women in the workplace, especially if the ostensible demographic threat posed 
by high Muslim rates of reproduction is to be countered. Essentially, his central 
contention is that postwar feminism has been detrimental to European culture. It has 
empowered women, but opened them up to exploitation too, especially by a new wave of 
Muslim men. Being dominated is a quality that women have a greater susceptibility to 
than men, so they are particularly vulnerable to the Muslim male. Indeed, at one point he 
even suggests that women secretly want to be dominated by Sharia Law ‘because they 
feel attracted to subservience and subjugation.’39 Moreover, feminism has also helped the 
alleged Muslim invasion of Europe in another way. While European men have accepted 
the liberation of European women as a result of feminism, this has only weakened the 
power of European masculinity, leaving Europe vulnerable to attack. As he strikingly 
frames the issue:  
 
 
The truth is that any nation is always protected from external aggression by the 
men. The women can play a supporting role in this, but never more than that. 
For all the talk about ‘girl power’ and ‘women kicking ass’ which you see on 
movies these days, if the men of your ‘tribe’ are too weak or demoralised to 
protect you, you will be enslaved and crushed by the men from other ‘tribes’ 
before you can say ‘Vagina Monologues’. Which means that if you break down 
men’s masculinity, their willingness and ability to defend themselves and their 
families, you destroy the country. That’s exactly what Western women have done 
for the last forty years.40 
 
As elsewhere in these essays by Jensen, the western education system, especially its 
universities, are blamed for promoting feminism, alongside other forms of political 
correctness that are crippling European masculinity. Moreover, the broad intellectual 
movement of feminism is reductively framed as a monolithic, ‘totalitarian’ ideology. 
 The impact of feminism is also linked to the emergent role of the welfare state in 
postwar European societies too, and again this is seen negatively. We have already noted 
that Jensen views the welfare state as a phenomenon that Muslims actively exploit to 
fund terrorism. But elsewhere too we see that Jensen views the welfare state a temporary 
phenomenon emerging in order to pick up the various caring roles that were previously 
carried out by women, needed now women seek employment. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, 
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Jensen also wants to see the welfare state, at least as we currently understand it, 
abolished. Nevertheless, he also outlines a need to develop new welfare policies that 
seem to employ aspects of positive eugenics, to ensure that more white European 
women have children. This includes offering superior-quality state housing to families 
with three or more children, and encouraging women to have children before the age of 
30 before fertility declines.  
More fundamentally still, in another essay on this theme, ‘The Fatherless 
Civilization’, Jensen discusses many of these topics again, yet here stresses that the 
modern world has created an infantilized culture, one where 
 
 
people return to childhood by being provided for by others. This creates not just a 
culture obsessed with youth but with adolescent irresponsibility. Many people live 
in a constant state of rebellion against not just their parents but their nation, their 
culture and their civilisation.41 
 
Note here that the trope specifically of the nation in decline, a process needing to be 
overturned, is one of Jensen’s crucial categories for restoring a healthy European order. 
Indeed, though he sees the issues raised as a pan-European phenomenon, he is a staunch 
defender of the idea of the nation state, as we will see below. Moreover, he stresses that a 
new era of masculine authority is needed to combat this impact of feminism and welfare 
policies across Europe. If not, then the continent faces a crisis as 
 
the current situation isn’t sustainable. The absence of fatherhood has created a 
society full of social pathologies, and the lack of male self-confidence has made 
us easy prey for our enemies. If the West is to survive, we need to reassert a 
healthy dose of male authority.42 
 
Thus, male authority has fallen into decline, while empowering women has weakened 
Europe’s resilience to invasion too. In reply, he suggests strengthening male power in 
Europe, from the family unit upwards. 
 
Defending National Borders and the Failure of Democracy 
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As we can see, then, the tenor of Jensen’s writings is designed to evoke the theme of 
Europe falling into an era of elemental decline, one that needs radical action in order to 
reverse such looming crises. In the essay ‘Democracy Not Working’, Jensen again alludes 
to this, and also begins to offer more detail on his critique of modern European political 
structures – which, as we have already seen elsewhere, he regards as being corrupted by 
Muslim influences. His wider criticisms of democracy includes points such as democratic 
systems tend to place short-term issues ahead of long-term strategic decision-making. 
However, his core, critical point is again around styling the present as becoming an era of 
crisis and potential transition. As he puts it, democracies rely on a sense of the demos, 
that is a body of people with a shared identity, to function. However, in a typical far right 
critique of globalization breaking down the authority of the nation state, he stresses that:  
 
What we are witnessing now is the gradual breakdown of this demos, starting 
from the top down. Powerful groups frequently have more in common with the 
elites in other countries than they have with the average citizen in their own. If 
you no longer believe in your nation as a real entity with a specific culture, it 
simply becomes a tool for obtaining power, a stepping stone for your global 
career. Without a pre-political loyalty, emotional ties or even a pragmatic interest 
in supporting nation states, the democratic system becomes a vehicle for 
distributing favors to your friends at home and abroad, for fleecing the voters 
while in power and hopefully ensuring a lucrative international career along the 
way. You will have few moral inhibitions against importing voters from abroad 
for maintaining power or because your business buddies who give you financial 
support desire it.43 
 
Indeed, the interrelated issue of strengthening national borders, and maintaining national 
cultures, is of crucial importance to Jensen. For example, we also see that he is regularly 
critical of neo-liberal free market positions that promote economic arguments above all 
others. He stresses these viewpoints include regular reference to what he dubs ‘the big 
lie’, namely that immigrants are good for national economies.  
Moreover, he stresses that, in the globalized age, the notion of protecting borders 
has become a testing point for politicians. If they fail in this duty, then the social contract 
is broken and elected politicians no longer have political legitimacy. As he puts it: 
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Upholding national borders has become more important in the age of 
globalisation, not less. We need to reclaim control over our borders and reject 
any organisation, either the EU, the UN, various human rights groups or others 
who prevent us from doing this. We must remind our political leaders that we 
pay national taxes because they are supposed to uphold our national borders. If 
they can’t do so, the social contract is breached, and we should no longer be 
required to pay our taxes.44 
 
Again, such assertions setting out the need to protect the nation state in the face of 
globalizing forces echo with wider patterns in fascist discourses which have historically 
been focused on decrying international forces that are ostensibly threatening national 
identity. Furthermore, in the essay ‘What Do We Fight For?’ Jensen evokes the notion of 
Europe entering into elemental decline by stressing that the continent is moving from a 
civilization of rationalism, to one dictated by emotion and sentimentality. He even singles 
out the intellectual trend of deconstruction, associated with the work of Jacques Derrida, 
as a further marker of the shift to cultural, and especially intellectual, decadence.45  
Another such essay setting out the core aims of his political cause, 
‘Recommendations for the West – 2’, Jensen similarly stresses that Europeans of the 
twenty-first century essentially lack ‘cultural confidence’, and are ‘engaged in an internal 
struggle over the very meaning of Western civilisation’.46 He also summarizes the core 
points that figures such as himself are fighting for as follows: national sovereignty; the 
right to protect national cultures and pass this to future generations; and to prevent the 
nation state from being undermined by ‘Leftist Utopians, unaccountable NGOs, 
transnational progressives or self-appointed guardians of the truth’.47 So clearly he has a 
political cause too, but how can we categorize this? 
 
‘Survivalism’, War and Palingenesis 
From the above, we can already characterize Jensen’s perspective as a very radical form 
of far right politics. It promotes an existential conflict based on the theme nationalism in 
crisis, and Europe as a whole needing to undergo a cultural ‘purification’. Moreover, the 
‘other’ that needs to be ‘purged’ to achieve this is Europe’s Muslim communities, though 
left wing politicians and those promoting multiculturalism come in for regular criticism 
too. We have also seen that his politics can also be categorized as anti-democratic, 
misogynistic, and pro-white, and so clearly this is a racist discourse too. But is Jensen 
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fascist? To fit into such a category, we need to find evidence that he promotes political 
revolution.48  
Curiously, even over the course of these selected texts, Jensen states that his views 
on the mechanisms for achieving the political changes he desires have altered, and 
hardened, over time. He stresses that initially he believed a reformist position could 
effect results, but has come to the conclusion that more fundamental change is now 
required to fend off Europe’s current threats. As he stresses: 
 
When I first started writing as Fjordman I focused on how to ‘fix the system.’ I’ve 
gradually come to the conclusion that the system cannot be fixed. Not only does it 
have too many enemies; it also contains too many internal contradictions. If we 
define the ‘system’ as mass immigration from alien cultures, Globalism, 
multiculturalism and suppression of free speech in the name of ‘tolerance,’ then 
this is going to collapse. It’s inevitable.49 
 
In response to such a position, the pathway offered by engaging with the political 
mainstream is presented as no longer an option for achieving political change. This leads 
him to present the need for some radical reassertions of authority by the people. For 
example: 
 
How should we respond to the threats our civilisation is facing? First of all, 
ordinary citizens should arm themselves immediately since crime and violence is 
spreading fast throughout the Western world. Second, we need to reclaim pride in 
our heritage, which has been systematically taken away from us in recent 
generations, and restore a proper teaching of this in our education system. We 
should assume that the mass media and our leaders are not telling us the full truth 
about the scale and consequences of Muslim immigration.50 
 
We can ask: do such statements promote terrorist violence? The text here is ambiguous. 
Armed citizens and a paranoid outlook are the markers of a turn to terrorism, but clearly 
there are limits to what he is saying here too. Jensen is advocating a selective embrace of 
such an armed strategy, to defend oneself, not an all out terrorist campaign. This sort of 
discourse may be read as a loose endorsement setting out a need for solo-actor or cell 
structure political violence, but it is far from clear on this point. This is not the same type 
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of language as one finds, say, in neo-Nazi terrorist literature such as Louis Beam’s 
Leaderless Resistance or Max Hammer’s Blood and Honour Field Manual.51  
Yet evoking broadly similar themes to such neo-Nazi political extremists, he also 
labels himself a ‘survivalist’. In the essay ‘The Strategy of Western Survivalists’ Jensen 
also sets out the reasons underpinning this logic too. He argues: 
 
The goal of Western survivalists — and that’s what we are — should not be to ‘fix 
the system,’ but to be mentally and physically prepared for its collapse, and to 
develop coherent answers to what went wrong and prepare to implement the 
necessary remedies when the time comes. We need to seize the window of 
opportunity, and in order to do so, we need to define clearly what we want to 
achieve. 
 What, exactly, is Western civilisation? What went wrong with it, and how can 
we survive and regenerate as a vulnerable minority in an increasingly hostile 
world?52 
 
So when we find Jensen writing in this sort of register, one clearly detached from 
reformist agendas and viewing the present through the lens of an elemental transition, 
his discourse does express the fascist myth of revolution, or palingenesis, as described in 
Griffin’s work on defining fascist ideologies in particular. Moreover, as part of this 
mythmaking, although the trope of some form of grand transition to a new era inevitably 
evokes a fearful scenario, Jensen is also keen to stress that the present crisis is also a 
momentous opportunity to those radical enough to seize the challenge. Coming closer to 
the moment of crisis is also coming closer to the emergence of a new era. Indeed, though 
he styles its powers as immense, he does not project into the future the inevitable 
triumph of the Eurabian project. Rather, he suggests that we are witnessing the end of 
what he dubs the ‘Eurabian Union’, and that, just as the Eastern Bloc came to an end 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, so multicultural Europe is coming to an end too. 
Elsewhere too, we find him make a similar elisions between the fall of the USSR and a 
projected fall of the EU with his use of the term ‘the EUSSR’, used to suggest that the 
two are akin, and that the EU is doomed in a similar way to the USSR was by the 
1980s.53 
 Yet although he views history as being on his side, as we have already seen, this 
process of transition is also one that will be marked by a new era of warfare, a point he is 
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keen to warn his readers of. As Jensen states: ‘will dub it the Multicultural World War. 
Just as WW1 was caused by Imperialism, WW2 by Fascism and the Cold War by 
Communism, this one will be caused by multiculturalism.’54 He continues this evocation 
of the present as a time when a world war is in the process of breaking out in the essay 
‘From the Death of Multiculturalism’. Here he stresses: 
 
A Multicultural society is only temporary. Sooner or later, we will return to a new 
mono-cultural society. This will happen either through the division of the 
previously coherent territory into new, mono-cultural enclaves or through the 
takeover by society as a whole of the most forceful and aggressive of these 
competing cultures. 
 My personal view is that the Jihad riots in France in 2005 could be 
interpreted as the early stages of a civil war, one of several Eurabian civil wars to 
come.55 
 
In other words, form major world conflict a new order will eventually emerge. We can 
take from such statements, styling the present as a liminal period between two discrete 
eras, that Jensen’s writings are a discourse operating in a fascist, revolutionary mode. The 
purging of the Muslim ‘other’ lies at the core of the purpose of this fascist revolution, 
while the reborn European civilization he foresees would restore a true sense of 
freedom, alongside masculine virtues, that would eliminate the other pollution he decries 
too: left-wing, multicultural and feminist values.  
  
Conclusions 
To conclude then, Peder Jensen was clearly highly influential on Breivik’s own 
worldview. Both embraced a new form of Islamophobic fascism, though the actions 
derived from this belief were different. Jensen chose to blog, while Breivik chose to carry 
out an act of terrorist violence. Moreover, Breivik found Jensen’s writings useful to him, 
and in particular saw common ground in identifying an existential threat posed by 
Muslims, and, as with Jensen, Breivik saw a process on invasion underway that could be 
styled as the early stages of civil war. Indeed, later in 2083 A European Declaration of 
Independence Breivik dated this civil war period as breaking out in 1999. So, by the time he 
carried out his terror campaign, Breivik too seems to have regarded Europe as being in a 
state of warfare, a theory he developed in part from Jensen’s writings. Moreover, for 
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Breivik violent action against ‘national traitors’, that is his 77 victims, was deemed valid 
due to living during this period of wartime.56 Yet we should also note that Jensen was not 
the only influence. As others have highlighted, Breivik also drew on a wider array of 
contributors too, especially the idea of ‘Cultural Marxism’ proposed by William S. Lind.57 
This offered a much more detailed and historicized critique of left wing figures than 
those to be found in Jensen’s texts. So we cannot frame Jensen’s contributions here as 
the only set of ideas feeding into Breivik’s rationale for action. The relationship is more 
complex that this, but nevertheless Jensen was central part of Breivik’s intellectual milieu.  
So to help characterize Jensen’s role here, we can to return to Kallis’ notion of 
license, and in particular his theme of a license to hate. Kallis stresses that such licenses 
to hate are important as they create frameworks that allow people justify, and give a 
rationale to, their heterophobia. In doing so, as with Jensen’s discourse summarized 
above, they are often steeped in fantasies presenting the ‘other’ as a pollutant, one ideally 
needing to be cleansed from the polity. The themes discussed here, so prevalent in the 
selection of Jensen’s essays that Breivik cited in 2083 A European Declaration of 
Independence, do not merely present an unarticulated rejection of Muslims as ‘other’. They 
do much more than this. They go to great lengths to historicise the role Muslims have 
played within European history, present lengthy analyses styling the nature of the threat, 
such as via the Eurabia narrative, and evoke a sense of plausibility by setting this 
discourse within a much wider body of writings that span a range of figures, form the 
more radical to the more mainstream, from Bat Ye’or to Michael Gove, and from Daniel 
Pipes to Melanie Phillips. What Jensen achieves via this discourse, then, is a framework 
for structuring heterophobia, lifting moral objections to developing a hatred of Muslims, 
and offering broad teleological messages too. His core position stresses that Europe’s 
flirtation with multiculturalism is a temporary aberration, not a permanent state. It will 
breed its own tensions and antinomies, and indeed he believes that the Eurabian 
conspiracy and multiculturalism is already provoking a new world war. He stresses that, 
while some of the developments here may be very dangerous, such as a Muslim-run 
France seizing control of nuclear warheads, ultimately the picture is a positive one. 
Europe will find a way to redeem itself, and will achieve purity once again by 
overthrowing the invading ‘other’. Moreover, his perspective helps to create a framework 
where violence towards those deemed responsible for the threats allegedly posed by 
Muslims – that is both Muslims themselves and politicians deemed to be promoting 
multiculturalism and the Eurabian conspiracy – becomes more desirable. So these 
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writings clearly had a radicalizing role to play, and as a consequence of their lengthy 
citation, consisting of 14.5% of the total word count for 2083 A European Declaration of 
Independence, were undoubtedly vital for Breivik’s rationalizations of his actions.  
To finish on a word of caution, it is also important to stress that promoting a 
license to hate is not the same thing as endorsing, or even carrying out, terrorist violence. 
As a terrorist actor, Anders Breivik did actively reconfigure these words into his own 
license to kill, and though Jensen may have a moral case to answer,58 one cannot hold 
such an ideologue as being legally responsible for the behavior of those who act on such 
messages. This leaves some open, problematic questions: To what extent are those who 
promote such licenses to hate destabilizing civil society? How far should states go to 
develop ways to monitor and limit such extremist fascist discourses, to prevent them 
from having a similar impact in the future? And what roles does civil society have in 
challenging these narratives, and is it prepared to deal with their effects?  
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